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Abstract
We consider Gillette’s two-person zero-sum stochastic games with per-
fect information. For each k ∈ Z+ we introduce an effective reward func-
tion, called k-total. For k = 0 and 1 this function is known as mean
payoff and total reward, respectively. We restrict our attention to the de-
terministic case. For all k, we prove the existence of a saddle point which
can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also
demonstrate that k-total reward games can be embedded into (k+1)-total
reward games.
Keywords: stochastic game with perfect information, cyclic games,
two-person, zero-sum, mean payoff, total reward
1 Introduction
We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect infor-
mation and for each positive integer k define an effective reward func-
tion, called the k-total reward, generalizing the classical mean payoffs [7]
(k = 0), as well as the total rewards [27, 28] (k = 1).
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to two-person zero-sum games with
deterministic positions, and the solution concept is Nash equilibrium,
which is just a saddle point in the considered case. We call the con-
sidered family of games k-total reward BW-games, where B and W stand
for the two players: Black (the minimizer) and White (the maximizer); in
the sequel we shall denote them by Min and Max.
We denote by R the set of reals, by Z the set of integers, and by Z+ the
set of nonnegative integers. For a subset I ⊆ Z+, let R
I denote the set of
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vectors indexed by the elements of I . In particular, S = RZ+\{0} denotes
the set of infinite real sequences. For a ∈ S we write a = (a1, a2, . . .).
Furthermore, for m ∈ Z+ \ {0} we define [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and write
simply Rm instead of R[m].
To describe BW-games, let us consider a finite directed graph (di-
graph) G = (V,E), whose vertices (also called positions or states) are
partitioned into two sets V = B ∪W , a fixed initial position v0 ∈ V , a
function r : E → R assigning real numbers to the arcs (moves1), and a
mapping π : S → R, where R = R∪{−∞,+∞}. We call the tuple (G, r, π)
a BW-game where r is its local reward and π is its effective reward. Two
players, Min and Max control the positions of B and W , respectively.
The game begins at time t = 0 in the initial position s0 = v0. In a gen-
eral step, in time t, we are at position st ∈ V . The player who controls
st chooses an outgoing arc et+1 = (st, v) ∈ E, and the game moves to
position st+1 = v. We assume, in fact without any loss of generality, that
every vertex in G has an outgoing arc. (Indeed, if not, one can add loops
to terminal vertices.) We assume that an initial vertex v0 is fixed. How-
ever, when we talk about solving a BW-game, we consider (separately) all
possible initial vertices. In general, the strategy of the player is a policy
by which (s)he chooses the outgoing arcs from the vertices (s)he controls.
This policy may involve the knowledge of the previous steps as well as
probabilistic decisions. We call a strategy stationary if it does not depend
on the history and pure if it does not involve probabilistic decisions; for
more details see Section 3.
In the course of this game players generate an infinite sequence of
edges p = (e1, e2, . . .) (a play) and the corresponding real sequence r(p) =
(r(e1), r(e2), . . .) ∈ S of local rewards. At the end (after infinitely many
steps) Min pays Max π(r(p)) amount. Naturally, Max’s aim is to create
a play which maximizes π(r(p)), while Min tries to minimize it. (Let
us note that the local reward function r : E → R may have negative
values, and π(r(p)) may also be negative, in which case Max has to pay
Min.) As usual, a pair of (not necessarily pure or stationary) strategies
is a saddle point if neither of the players can improve individually by
changing her/his strategy. The corresponding π(r(p)) is the value of the
game with respect to initial position v0. Such a pair of strategies are
called optimal; furthermore, it is called uniformly optimal if it provides
the value of the game for any initial position.
As we shall see later, it will be enough to restrict ourselves, and the
players, to their pure stationary strategies in these BW-games. This
means that each player chooses, in advance, a move in every position
that (s)he controls and makes this move whenever the play comes to this
position. Then, the play is uniquely determined by the one time selec-
tion of arcs and by the initial position. Such a play always looks like a
“lasso”: it consists of an initial path entering a directed cycle, which is
then repeated infinitely many times.
Mean payoff (undiscounted) stochastic games, introduced in [7], in-
1Following standard terminology, we will use vertices and arcs when we talk about graphs
and positions and moves when we talk about games.
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clude BW-games (see also [22, 23, 5, 11]) with effective reward function
π = φ:
φ(a) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
j=1
aj , (1)
where a := (a1, a2, . . .) is the sequence of expected local rewards incurred
at times 1, 2, . . . of the play. Such a game is known to have a saddle point
in pure stationary strategies [7, 18].
Discounted (mean) payoff stochastic games were in fact introduced
earlier in [26] and have payoff function π = φβ :
φβ(a) = (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
βj−1aj , (2)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the so-called discount factor. Since the set of positions
V is finite, the aj values are bounded. Thus, as a consequence of the
classical Hardy-Littlewood Tauberian theorems [13], we have the equality
φ(a) = lim
β→1−
φβ(a). (3)
Discounted games, in general, are easier to solve, due to the fact that a
standard value iteration is a converging contraction. For this reason they
are widely used in the literature of stochastic games together with the
above limit equality. In fact, for mean payoff BW-games with integral
rewards with maximum absolute value R, it is known [30] that, if 1 −
β ≤ 1
4|V |3R
then for any two infinite reward sequences a,b the inequality
φ(a) < φ(b) implies φβ(a) < φβ(b).
Total reward, introduced in [27] and considered in more detail in [28],
is defined by
ψ(a) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
aj . (4)
It was shown in [28] that a total reward game is equivalent with a mean
payoff game having countably many positions. From this the authors de-
rive that every total reward game has a value. Furthermore, ǫ-optimal
Markovian strategies2 can be constructed. The proof of the latter is anal-
ogous to the proof in [19].
It is worth noting that the 1-total reward games with nonnegative local
rewards are polynomially solvable [21]. This contrasts the fact that mean
payoff games with nonnegative rewards are as hard as general mean payoff
games, and that the fastest known algorithms for mean payoff BW-games
are either pseudo-polynomial [11, 24, 30] or randomized subexponential
[1, 12, 29].
In this paper we extend and generalize the above results. For every
k ∈ Z+, we define the k-total effective reward, which coincides with the
mean payoff when k = 0 and with the total reward when k = 1.
2A history-dependent strategy is called Markovian if the move depends only on time and
position (but not the complete history).
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Figure 1: A one-person game with 5 plays.
In general, given a sequence of local rewards a = (a1, a2, . . .) let us
associate to it another sequence M(a) = (a1, a1 + a2, . . .). Then the k-
total reward φ(k)(a) is defined as the mean payoff of the sequence Mk(a).
Let us note that M(a) may not be a bounded sequence, even if a is.
Consequently, φ(k) may take infinite values.
Examples. For instance, consider the following 5 sequences:
a
0 = (0, 0, . . .),
a
1 = (1, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0,−1, . . .),
a
2 = (−1, 0, 1, 0,−1, 0, 1, . . .),
a
3 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1,−1,−1, 1, 1, . . .),
a
4 = (−1, 1, 1,−1,−1, 1, 1,−1,−1, . . .).
Then we have M(a4) = a2 and M(a5) = a3.
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4
φ(0)(ai) 0 0 0 0 0
φ(1)(ai) 0 1
2
− 1
2
0 0
φ(2)(ai) 0 +∞ −∞ 1
2
− 1
2
φ(3)(ai) 0 +∞ −∞ +∞ −∞
φ(4)(ai) 0 +∞ −∞ +∞ −∞
Motivation. The 0-total reward is a classic payoff function [7, 18]. As
we will show, the family of 1-total reward games includes the family of 0-
total reward games (see Corollary 7). On the other hand, Thuijsman and
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Vrieze [27, 28] regard the 1-total reward as a refinement of the 0-total one,
in the sense that it can be used to distinguish between optimal pairs of
strategies which have the same 0-total values (equal to 0). In other words,
the 1-total reward, when used as a refinement of the 0-total reward, has
higher sensitivity, see e.g. [25].
Furthermore, 1-total reward games have numerous applications, e.g.,
shortest path interdiction [6, 14, 17, 16] and scheduling with and/or prece-
dence constraints [21].
Motivated by this, we introduce the k-total reward as a refinement
of the (k − 1)-total reward, and show a similar sensitivity behavior as in
the case k = 1. In fact, the larger k is, the more the effective reward
φ(k) emphasizes the initial segment of the play. To understand this, it
is instructive to look at the example given above. One can imagine a
scenario in which the 5 given sequences correspond to different possible
plays of a BW-game (see Figure 1). Note that all the above sequences
have equal values according to the 0-total measure. How to rank these
plays? The 1-total reward can distinguish between a1 and a2, for example,
but not between a0, a3 and a4. On the other hand, 2−total reward can
differentiate all the above 5 sequences.
Remark 1 The k-total effective reward looks somewhat similar to the
moment Mk in the theory of probability. The first two cases k = 0 and
k = 1 are easy to interpret and they play a very important role: the first
two moments M0 and M1 are the expectation and variance, the 0- and
1-total payoffs are the mean and total effective payoffs, respectively. Yet,
the higher moments have some important applications too.
Remark 2 The existence of optimal pure stationary strategies in 1-total
reward games can be derived from the general results in [8]. The authors
also left an open question at the end of the paper about effective reward
functions φ that guarantee the existence of optimal pure stationary strate-
gies for all BW-games, namely, whether such a φ can always be expressed
as a non-decreasing function of a fairly mixing mapping of the reward se-
quence; see [8] for the definition and more details. It is easy however to
check that the 2-total reward answers this question in the negative.
Main Results. First, we show that every k-total reward BW-game,
when restricted to pure stationary strategies, has the same optimal strat-
egy as the corresponding discounted mean payoff (0-total) game, if the
discount factor is close enough to 1. Let us note however that this does
not prove the existence of a saddle point among all (not necessarily pure
or stationary) strategies. For the latter, one needs to show that in a k-
total reward game, to a fixed pure stationary strategy of one player, there
exists a best response of the other player that is also pure and stationary.
In fact we show a stronger result, namely that there exists a pure station-
ary best response that uniformly dominates any other response; c.f. [19]
for the concept of uniformity. This is our second result, which with the
previous claim implies now the existence of a saddle point in any k-total
reward game. Moreover, this also shows that such a saddle point can be
realized in uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies.
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Remark 3 Thuijsman and Vrieze [28] gave a necessary and sufficient
condition for a 1-total general stochastic game to have a saddle point pro-
vided the players are restricted to their pure stationary strategies. For
the case of games with perfect information, this result was extended in [4]
to include history-dependent strategies. In particular, this gives another
proof of the 1-total case considered in the current paper. However, for
k > 1 no such condition is known.
Next, we prove that the k-total reward BW-games can be embedded3
into the family of (k + 1)-total reward BW-games, for each k ∈ Z+. In
particular, mean payoff games can be embedded into k-total reward games
for all k ∈ Z+. This containment and the example in [10] prove that for
each k ∈ Z+, there is a non-zero sum k-total reward game without Nash
equilibria.
2 Iterated Total Rewards
In this section we introduce a complete hierarchy of effective reward func-
tions providing a natural generalization of mean and total payoffs, and
their discounted counterparts.
Let us first introduce three operators acting on infinite sequences of
reals. The limiting average A : S → R and discounted limiting average
Aβ : S → R operators map an infinite sequence into the set of reals, while
the moment M : S → S operator maps it into another infinite sequence.
More precisely, given an infinite sequence a = (a1, a2, . . .) and a real
0 < β < 1 we define
A(a) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
j=1
aj (5)
and
Aβ(a) = (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
βj−1aj . (6)
For convenience, we also extend the definition of the operator A for finite
sequences a to denote the average of the elements of a.
Finally, recall that we define M(a) = b = (b1, b2, . . .) ∈ S by setting
bi =
i∑
j=1
aj for all i = 1, 2, . . . (7)
For k = 0, 1, . . . , we callMk(a) :=M(Mk−1(a)) the kth moment sequence
of a, and define M0(a) = a. For convenience we also extend M for finite
sequences. For a ∈ Rn, we use (7) to define b =M(a) ∈ Rn.
We also introduce the following families of functions φ(k) : S → R and
φ
(k)
β : S → R for k = 0, 1, . . ., defined by
φ(k)(a) = A
(
Mk(a)
)
and φ
(k)
β (a) = Aβ
(
Mk(a)
)
. (8)
3that is, for every k-total reward game we can construct an equivalent (k+1)-total reward
game, i.e., solving the latter provides a solution to the former.
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Let us note that φ(0) = φ is the mean payoff function, φ
(0)
β = φβ is
the discounted mean payoff, while φ(1) = ψ is the total reward. Following
this terminology, we call φ(k) the k-total reward, and φ
(k)
β the discounted
k-total reward. Thus the above hierarchy of effective reward functions
provides a natural generalization of mean payoff and total reward.
We show first that the M operator changes the discounted total re-
wards by a factor that depends only on β.
Fact 1 For all a ∈ S and for all 0 < β < 1 we have
Aβ(M(a)) =
1
1− β
Aβ(a).
Proof Using definition (6) and (7) we can write
Aβ(M(a)) = (1− β)
∞∑
i=1
βi−1
(
i∑
j=1
aj
)
= (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
aj
(
∞∑
i=j
βi−1
)
= (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
βj−1aj
(
∞∑
i=j
βi−j
)
= (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
βj−1aj
(
∞∑
ℓ=0
βℓ
)
= (1− β)
∞∑
j=1
βj−1aj
(
1
1− β
)
=
1
1− β
Aβ(a).

The above fact shows that φ
(k)
β (1−β)
k = φβ, that is, all k-total reward
BW-games have equivalent discounted versions.
Given two sequences, x ∈ Rp and y ∈ Rq, let us denote by a = (x(y))
the infinite sequence obtained by listing first the elements of x and then
repeating y cyclically, infinitely many times. Let us call such an a a lasso
sequence, and let us denote the set of lasso sequences that can arise from
a graph on n vertices by
Sn(R) =
a = (x(y))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p, q ∈ Z+, p+ q ≤ n, q ≥ 1
x ∈ [−R,R]p, y ∈ [−R,R]q
 ,
where R is a given constant. Note that a BW-game with n positions in
pure stationary strategies always produces a play p such that the corre-
sponding rewards sequence r(p) belongs to Sn(R), if R is an upper bound
on the absolute values of the local rewards. We shall simply write Sn
when R is not specified. In the sequel, when we write x(y) we assume
that there are nonnegative integers p and q ≥ 1 such that x ∈ Rp, y ∈ Rq,
and p+ q ≤ n.
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To be able to state and prove our main results about iterated total
rewards, we need next to analyze the above operations on lasso sequences.
Fact 2 For a = (x(y)) ∈ Sn, we have
ai =
 xi if i ≤ p,yr if i = p+ ℓq + r for some integers ℓ ≥ 0, 0 < r ≤ q.
Fact 3 For a = (x(y)) ∈ Sn, we have
M(a)i =

i∑
j=1
xj if i ≤ p
p∑
j=1
xj + ℓ
q∑
j=1
yj +
r∑
j=1
yj if i = p+ ℓq + r for integers ℓ ≥ 0, 0 < r ≤ q.
Fact 4 For a = (x(y)) ∈ Sn, we have
A(M(x(y))) =
{
+∞ if A(x(y)) = A(y) > 0,
−∞ if A(x(y)) = A(y) < 0.
Note that there is an example in [4] showing that Fact 4 does not nec-
essarily hold for reward sequences corresponding to non-stationary strate-
gies. Furthermore, M(x(y)) is not a lasso sequence, in general. However,
the above facts, obtained by simple counting arguments, imply the fol-
lowing claim, the second part of which can be obtained from the first part
by induction on k:
Fact 5 If x(y) ∈ Sn(R) such that A(y) = 0, then M(x(y)) = x˜(y˜) ∈
Sn(nR), where x˜ =M(x) and y˜ = pA(x)+M(y). Furthermore, if x(y) ∈
Sn(R) such that A(x(y)) = A(M(x(y))) = · · · = A(M
k−1(x(y))) = 0,
then Mk(x(y)) ∈ Sn(n
kR).
Recall that by adding a scalar to a vector we mean incrementing all com-
ponents of the vector by the same scalar value.
The above properties allow us to generalize an inequality between the
discounted and undiscounted payoffs shown by [30] for the mean payoff
case.
Lemma 1 If x(y) ∈ Sn(R) such that A(x(y)) = A(M(x(y))) = · · ·
= A(Mk−1(x(y))) = 0, then
|φ(k)(x(y))−
1
(1− β)k
φβ(x(y))| ≤ 2(1− β)n
k+1R.
Proof It was shown in [30] that for a lasso sequence (x(y)) ∈ Sn(R) we
have
|A(x(y))− Aβ(x(y))| ≤ 2(1− β)nR.
Applying this for an arbitrary lasso sequence x˜(y˜) ∈ Sn(n
kR) we get
|A(x˜(y˜))− Aβ(x˜(y˜))| ≤ 2(1− β)n(n
kR) = 2(1− β)nk+1R.
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By Fact 5 we have Mk(x(y)) ∈ Sn(n
kR), thus applying the above for
x˜(y˜) =Mk(x(y)) we get
|A(Mk(x(y)))−Aβ(M
k(x(y)))| ≤ 2(1− β)nk+1R.
By Fact 1 we have Aβ(M
k(a)) = 1
(1−β)k
Aβ(a), and thus the above implies
our claim. 
3 Uniform Optimality within Stationary
Strategies
In this section we introduce formal definitions and notation for pure sta-
tionary strategies and prove that any k-total BW-game has a uniformly
optimal saddle point when restricted to this family of strategies. Any
such strategy corresponds to a lasso sequence. We recall Shapley’s result
that a discounted game has a uniformly optimal saddle point in pure sta-
tionary strategies, and then prove that φ(k) ranks the lasso sequences in
agreement with φβ if β is sufficiently close to 1.
Let us consider a BW-game (G, r, π). As before, we denote by R the
largest absolute value of a local reward
R = max
e∈E
|r(e)|.
For a subset F ⊆ E of the arcs of the directed graph G = (V,E) we denote
by d+F (v) the out-degree of vertex v ∈ V in the subgraph (V, F ). A subset
F ⊆ E of the arcs is a pure stationary strategy of Min (resp., Max) if
d+F (v) = 1 for all v ∈ B (resp., for all v ∈ W ). Let us denote by SB and
SW the sets of pure stationary strategies of Min and Max, respectively.
Given a pair of pure stationary strategies, b ∈ SB and w ∈ SW , we
have a unique walk e1, e2, . . . , ep, ep+1, . . . , ep+q, ep+1, ep+2, . . . , ep+q, . . .
from every initial position v0 ∈ V , which consists of an initial path
e1, e2, . . . , ep followed by a cycle ep+1, . . . , ep+q, which we traverse in-
finitely many times. We denote by x = x(v0; b,w) and y = y(v0; b,w)
the corresponding reward sequences x = (r(ej) | j = 1, . . . , p) and y =
(r(ep+j) | j = 1, . . . , q), and by c(v0; b,w) the payoff value corresponding
to effective reward π:
c(v0; b,w) = π(x(y)).
We say that a pair of strategies (b∗,w∗), b∗ ∈ SB , w
∗ ∈ SW is a saddle
point for initial position v0 ∈ V if
c(v0; b
∗,w) ≤ c(v0; b
∗,w∗) ≤ c(v0; b,w
∗) (9)
hold for all b ∈ SB and w ∈ SW . We say that (b
∗,w∗) is a uniform
saddle point if (9) holds for all initial positions v0 ∈ V .
The following result follows essentially from [26].
Fact 6 A BW-game with the discounted mean payoff function π = φβ has
a uniform saddle point for all 0 < β < 1,
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Given a positive integer ℓ and a local reward function r, let us define
ǫ(ℓ, r) > 0 as the smallest positive number that can arise as the absolute
value of an integer linear combination of the r values with coefficients not
larger than nℓ+1. Note that by the above definition the following relations
hold for all ℓ, r, and lasso sequences x(y), x˜(y˜) ∈ Sn:
ǫ(ℓ, r) ≥ ǫ(ℓ+ 1, r), (10)
φ(ℓ)(x(y)) 6= 0 =⇒ |φ(ℓ)(x(y))| ≥
ǫ(ℓ, r)
n
, (11)
φ(ℓ)(x(y)) 6= φ(ℓ)(x˜(y˜)) =⇒ |φ(ℓ)(x(y))− φ(ℓ)(x˜(y˜))| ≥
ǫ(ℓ, r)
n2
. (12)
Let us also note that if the local reward function r is integral, then ǫ(ℓ, r) ≥
1 for all integers ℓ.
We shall show next that an optimal pair of pure stationary strategies
with respect to φβ also forms a uniform saddle point with respect to the
total reward π = φ(k), if β is close enough to 1.
Theorem 1 Consider (G, r) as above, and choose a discount factor sat-
isfying 0 ≤ (1 − β) < ǫ(k,r)
4nk+3R
. Let us consider a uniform saddle point
(b∗,w∗) with respect to the discounted mean payoff φβ . Then, (b
∗,w∗) is
also a uniform saddle point with respect to the k-total reward φ(k).
Proof We introduce two preorders ≺β and ≺k on the set of lasso se-
quences Sn(R) as follows: for two sequences (x(y)) and (x˜(y˜)) we say
that (x(y)) ≺β (x˜(y˜)) (resp., (x(y)) ≺k (x˜(y˜))) if φβ(x(y)) ≤ φβ(x˜(y˜))
(resp., φ(k)(x(y)) ≤ φ(k)(x˜(y˜))). We shall show that the preorder ≺β
induced by φβ on Sn(R) is a refinement of ≺k induced by φ
(k). For this
end let us first prove some partial claim about ≺β. Introduce
S(ℓ,+)=
{
x(y) ∈ Sn(R) | φ
(j)(x(y)) = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, and φ(ℓ)(x(y)) > 0
}
S(ℓ,−)=
{
x(y) ∈ Sn(R) | φ
(j)(x(y)) = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, and φ(ℓ)(x(y)) < 0
}
for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, and set
S∗ =
{
x(y) ∈ Sn(R) | φ
(j)(x(y)) = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1
}
.
It is immediate to see by these definitions that these sets partition Sn(R).
We claim that the following relations hold:
S(0,−) ≺β · · · S(k−1,−) ≺β S
∗ ≺β S(k−1,+) ≺β · · · ≺β S(0,+). (13)
To see this, let us fix an index 0 ≤ ℓ < k, and consider x(y) ∈ S(ℓ,+) and
x˜(y˜) ∈ S(ℓ + 1,+) (or this could be S∗ if ℓ = k − 1). Lemma 1 implies
that ∣∣∣∣φ(ℓ)(x(y))− φβ(x(y))(1− β)ℓ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(1− β)nℓ+1R < ǫ(k, r)2nk+2−ℓ ,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of β.
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By (10) and (11), we have
φ(ℓ)(x(y)) ≥
ǫ(ℓ, r)
n
≥
ǫ(k, r)
n
.
Thus, the above imply
φβ(x(y))
(1− β)ℓ
>
ǫ(k, r)
n
−
ǫ(k, r)
2nk+2−ℓ
>
ǫ(k, r)
2n
. (14)
On the other hand we can apply Lemma 1 for x˜(y˜), too, yielding∣∣∣∣φ(ℓ)(x˜(y˜))− φβ(x˜(y˜))(1− β)ℓ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(1− β)nℓ+1R < ǫ(k, r)2nk+2−ℓ .
Since we have φ(ℓ)(x˜(y˜)) = 0, we get
φβ(x˜(y˜))
(1− β)ℓ
<
ǫ(k, r)
2nk+2−ℓ
<
ǫ(k, r)
2n
. (15)
Inequalities (14) and (15) together imply that S(ℓ+ 1,+) ≺β S(ℓ,+) (or
S∗ ≺β S(k−1,+)). Analogous arguments work for the negative side, too,
and hence (13) follows.
Since φ(k) has value +∞ on S(ℓ,+) for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and value
−∞ on the sets S(ℓ,−) for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 by Fact 5, the only thing
left to prove that ≺β is a refinement of that of ≺k is to show that these
two preorders do not conflict on the set S∗.
To this end let us consider two lasso sequences x(y), x˜(y˜) ∈ S∗ such
that φ(k) has different values on these sequences. Since φ(k)(x(y)) =
A(Mk(x(y))) and for x(y) ∈ S∗ we have Mk(x(y)) ∈ Sn(n
kR) by Fact 5.
We can conclude by (12) that the difference between two non-equal φ(k)
values is always at least ǫ(k, r)/n2, say:
φ(k)(x(y))− φ(k)(x˜(y˜)) ≥
ǫ(k, r)
n2
.
As above, Lemma 1 and our assumption on β imply that∣∣∣φ(k)(x(y))− φβ(x(y))
(1−β)k
∣∣∣ < ǫ(k,r)2n2 , and∣∣∣φ(k)(x˜(y˜))− φβ(x˜(y˜))
(1−β)k
∣∣∣ < ǫ(k,r)2n2 .
The above three inequalities imply φβ(x(y)) > φβ(x˜(y˜)), proving our
claim, and hence completing the proof of the theorem. 
Note that the above result generalizes the result in [30] corresponding
to the case k = 0.
Let us remark that the proof of the above theorem in fact provides a
more complete picture about these iterated total reward functions than the
statement of the theorem alone. Namely, the effective reward functions
φ(k), k = 0, 1, . . . form a nested sequence, in the sense that the lasso
sequences on which φ(k+1) vanishes form a subset of those where φ(k)
vanishes, and φ(k+1) has a finite value only on sequences on which φ(k)
vanishes. Furthermore, (13) can be claimed for an arbitrary integer k,
providing a complete hierarchy.
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4 Best Response to Pure Stationary Strate-
gies
In this section, we will show that, to a player’s pure stationary strategy,
the best response of the other player can be realized by a pure station-
ary strategy, even if that player is allowed to use any history dependent
strategy.
First we obtain several combinatorial results about finite sequences.
Next, we will prove that any pure history dependent response to a pure
stationary strategy can be replaced by a pure stationary strategy that is
uniformly not worse, c.f. [19]. Such uniformity allows us to prove that
the best stationary response is at least as good as any history dependent
(not necessarily pure) strategy.
We will use two operators on finite sequences: for a sequence a =
(a1, a2, . . . , an) we have S(a) =
∑n
i=1 ai andM(a) = (a1, a1+a2, . . . , S(a)).
Note that both M : Rn → Rn and S : Rn → R are linear operators.
Lemma 2 For sequences a,b ∈ Rn and real λ ∈ R we have
S(a+ b) = S(a) + S(b) (16a)
S(λa) = λS(a) (16b)
M(a+ b) =M(a) +M(b) (16c)
M(λa) = λM(a) (16d)
Proof It follows by the definitions of these operators. 
To start our analysis, let us consider the all-one vector e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈
R
n, and compute its iterated M images and the corresponding sums.
Lemma 3 For e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn and for every k ∈ Z+ we have
Mk(e) =
((
k − 1 + j
k
) ∣∣∣∣∣ j = 1, . . . , n
)
(17)
and correspondingly
S(Mk(e)) =
(
n+ k
k + 1
)
. (18)
Proof The above expressions are clearly correct for k = 0. We can prove
them by induction on k using the binomial identity
k∑
j=0
(
a+ j
a
)
=
(
a+ k + 1
k
)
(19)
for all integers a and k. 
For a sequence I of integers (indices), we denote by aI the sequence
of the corresponding a components. E.g., if a = (a1, a2, a3, . . .) and I =
(1, 2, 3, 2), then aI = (a1, a2, a3, a2). We denote by [1, n] the sequence of
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integers from 1 to n. If a and b are two finite sequences then we denote
by (a,b) their concatenation. For a sequence I of indices we denote by
eI the sequence of 1-s of length |I | indexed by i ∈ I .
With this notation, the k-total value of an infinite sequence a of local
rewards can be rewritten as
φ(k)(a) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
S(Mk(a[1,T ])).
Assume in the sequel that X, Y and Z are subsets of the indices, and
a, b, and c are finite sequences of appropriate lengths.
Lemma 4
M(a(X,Y )) = (M(aX), M(aY ) + S(aX)eY ) , (20a)
Mk(a(X,Y )) =
(
Mk(aX),M
k(aY ) +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))M
ℓ−1(eY )
)
.
(20b)
Proof Equality (20a) follows by the definitions ofM and S. For (20b) we
use (20a), (16c), (16d) and induction on k. For k = 0 we getM0(a(X,Y )) =
(aX ,aY ), and for k = 1 we get
M(a(X,Y )) = M(aX , aY ) = (M(aX),M(aY ) + S(aX)eY )
by the definition of M , as in (20a). Then, by induction on k we get
Mk+1(a(X,Y )) =M
(
Mk(aX),M
k(aY ) +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))M
ℓ−1(eY )
)
=
(
Mk+1(aX),M
k+1(aY ) + S(M
k(aX))eY +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))M
ℓ(eY )
)
=
(
Mk+1(aX),M
k+1(aY ) +
k+1∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk+1−ℓ(aX))M
ℓ−1(eY )
)
.

Corollary 1
S(Mk(a(X,Y ))) = S(M
k(aX)) + S(M
k(aY )) +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))S(M
ℓ−1(eY ))
= S(Mk(aX)) + S(M
k(aY )) +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))
(
|Y |+ ℓ− 1
ℓ
)
.
Proof By Lemmas 2 and 4, and by the equality
S(M ℓ−1(eY )) =
(
|Y |+ ℓ− 1
ℓ
)
. (21)

One of the operations we will use to prove our main claim of this
section is the deletion of a middle interval from a sequence. To see the
effect of such a step we need the following claims.
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Corollary 2
Mk(a(X,Y,Z)) =
(
Mk(aX),M
k(aY ) +
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))M
ℓ−1(eY ),
Mk(aZ) +
k∑
ℓ=1
(
S(Mk−ℓ(aX)) + S(M
k−ℓ(aY ))
)
M ℓ−1(eZ)
+
k∑
ℓ=1
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))
ℓ−1∑
m=1
(
|Y |+ ℓ− 1−m
ℓ−m
)
Mm−1(eZ)
)
.
Proof Apply Lemma 4 with (Y,Z) instead of Y , and then again with
Y,Z instead of X,Y , and use Lemma 3. 
Corollary 3
S(Mk(a(X,Y,Z))) = S(M
k(aX)) + S(M
k(aY )) + S(M
k(aZ))
+
k∑
ℓ=1
(
S(Mk−ℓ(aX))
(
|Y |+ |Z| + ℓ− 1
ℓ
)
+ S(Mk−ℓ(aY ))
(
|Z|+ ℓ− 1
ℓ
))
.
Proof Apply (16a) and (16b) of Lemma 2 and Corollary 2 above together
with the equality (21) applied for both eY and eZ , and finally use the
binomial identity
ℓ∑
m=0
(
|Y |+ ℓ− 1−m
ℓ−m
)(
|Z| +m− 1
m
)
=
(
|Y |+ |Z|+ ℓ− 1
ℓ
)
. (22)

Corollary 4
S(Mk(a(X,Y,Z))) = S(M
k(a(X,Z)))+
k∑
ℓ=0
(
|Z|+ k − 1− ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(a(X,Y )))− S(M
ℓ(aX))
)
.
Proof Elementary calculations by Corollaries 1, 3, and by the binomial
identity (22). 
Corollary 5 If a = x(y) is a lasso sequence, where x = aX and y = aY ,
and (
S(M ℓ(a(X,Y )))− S(M
ℓ(aX))
)
= 0 for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, (23a)
then we have
φ(k)(a) =
1
|Y |
(
S(Mk(a(X,Y )))− S(M
k(aX))
)
. (23b)
Furthermore, if condition (23a) does not hold, and 0 ≤ m < k is the
smallest index with S(Mm(a(X,Y )))− S(M
m(aX)) 6= 0, then we have
φ(k)(a) =
{
−∞ if S(Mm(a(X,Y )))− S(M
m(aX)) < 0,
+∞ if S(Mm(a(X,Y )))− S(M
m(aX)) > 0.
(23c)
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Proof For a positive integer T let us define ρ(T ) = (T−|X|) mod |Y | and
α(T ) = T−|X|−rT
|Y |
. Furthermore, let us denote by Zρ the first ρ elements
of Y , for 0 ≤ ρ < |Y |, and by αY = (Y, Y, . . . , Y ) the concatenation of Y
α times. Then, for the lasso sequence a = aX(aY ) we have
φ(k)(a) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
S(Mk(a(X,α(T )Y,Zρ(T ))). (24)
Let us now apply Corollary 4 with Z = ((λ− 1)Y, Zρ(T )) for an arbitrary
positive integer λ to get
S(Mk(a(X,λY,Zρ(T))) = S(M
k(a(X,(λ−1)Y,Zρ(T)))
+
k∑
ℓ=0
(
ρ(T ) + (λ− 1)|Y |+ k − 1− ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(a(X,Y )))− S(M
ℓ(aX))
)
.
(25)
Assume first that condition (23a) holds. Then the above equality simplifies
to
S(Mk(a(X,λY,Zρ(T))) = S(M
k(a(X,(λ−1)Y,Zρ(T)))+S(M
k(a(X,Y )))−S(M
k(aX)).
Summing up the above equalities for λ = 1, . . . , α(T ), we get
S(Mk(a(X,α(T )Y,Zρ(T ))) = S(M
k(a(X,Zρ(T)))
+ α(T )
(
S(Mk(a(X,Y )))− S(M
k(aX))
)
. (26)
Since S(Mk(a(X,Zρ(T))) and |X|+ ρ(T ) are both bounded independently
of T , and since
lim
T→∞
α(T )
T
= lim
T→∞
α(T )
|X|+ α(T )|Y |+ ρ(T )
=
1
|Y |
,
we get from (24) and (26) that
φ(k)(a) =
1
|Y |
(
S(Mk(a(X,Y )))− S(M
k(aX))
)
as claimed in (23b).
Let us assume next that condition (23a) does not hold, and let m be
the smallest index such that S(Mm(a(X,Y )))−S(M
m(aX)) 6= 0. Consider
equality (25), and note that the summation on the right hand side can
be viewed as a polynomial p(λ), which is of degree k −m and in which
the sign of the leading term is the same as the sign of S(Mm(a(X,Y ))) −
S(Mm(aX)). Then,
α(T )∑
λ=1
p(λ) = q(α(T ))
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is a polynomial of α(T ) of degree k −m + 1, and the sign of its leading
term is the same as the sign of S(Mm(a(X,Y )))− S(M
m(aX)). Thus, by
summing up (25) for λ = 1, . . . , α(T ) we get
S(Mk(a(X,α(T )Y,Zρ(T ))) = S(M
k(a(X,Zρ(T ))) + q(α(T )). (27)
Since k − m + 1 > 1 and since S(Mk(a(X,Zρ(T ))) and |X| + ρ(T ) are
both bounded independently of T , we obtain (23c) from (24) and (27) by
dividing by T and taking limits. 
Let us call in the sequel a lasso sequence good if (23a) holds, and call
it bad otherwise.
Given a BW-game Γ, we denote by PB(Γ) and PW (Γ) the sets of (not
necessarily pure or stationary) strategies of Min and Max, respectively.
Let us note that the families of pure stationary strategies SB and SW
are proper subsets of PB and PW , respectively. Given a pair of strategies
(b,w) we denote by a(b,w) the corresponding infinite sequence of expected
local rewards.
Let us note that a pair of pure strategies defines an infinite walk in G
starting from the initial position v0. In the next lemma we will analyze
the structure of this walk and show that it can be decomposed in a certain
way into lassos and paths. Let us introduce some notation first.
Consider such an infinite walk W = (v0, v1, . . .) in G. This infinite
walk will have some repeated vertices and arcs. As before, let us denote
by et = (vt−1, vt) the edges of this walk, and by at = r(et) the local
rewards, for t = 1, 2, . . ., and set F = {e1, e2, . . .} to denote the sequence
of arcs in this infinite walk in G. Denote for integers i < j by [i, j] the
set of integers {i, i + 1, . . . , j}, and set J0 = {1, 2, . . .} to denote the set
of positive integers. To an increasing subset I = {i1, i2, . . .} ⊆ J0 of the
indices, i1 < i2 < · · · , we associate the edge set F (I) = {ei | i ∈ I} and
we say that F (I) is a walk in G if the endpoint of eis is the beginning of
eis+1 , that is if vis = vis+1−1 for all s = 1, 2, . . .. Note that if s ∈ I , then
F (I ∩ [1, s]) is also a walk in G.
Let us consider an arbitrary infinite increasing sequence I of integers
such that F (I) is a walk in G and let q = q(I) be the smallest integer
q ∈ I such that vertex vq is repeated in the walk F (I ∩ [1, q]). Let us
denote then by p = p(I) the unique index p < q, p ∈ I for which vp = vq .
Let us introduce C(I) = I ∩ [p + 1, q], set P (I) = I ∩ [1, p] and define
J(I) = I \ [p+ 1, q]. Observe that F (P (I),C(I)) is a lasso sequence with
F (C(I)) as its cycle, and that F (J(I)) is again a walk in G.
Next, starting with I = J0 and F = F (J0), let us define ps = p(Js−1),
qs = q(Js−1), Ps = P (Js−1), Cs = C(Js−1), Ls = (Ps, Cs) and set Js =
J(Js−1), recursively for s = 1, 2, . . .. Note that by the above observation
F (Jk) ⊆ F is a walk in G, F (Cs) is a cycle, and F (Ls) is a lasso with
F (Cs) as its cycle, for every index s.
For a positive integer T let us define s(T ) as the largest index s for
which qs ≤ T . Furthermore, for any s ≤ s(T ), let us introduce Qs =
[qs + 1, T ]. Note that F (Ps(T ), Qs(T )) is a simple path in G (that is, a
path with no repeated vertices).
16
Lemma 5 Let W be an infinite walk as above and a be the corresponding
infinite sequence of local rewards. Then for every time horizon T we have
the following equality:
S(Mk(a[1,T ])) = S(M
k(a(Ps(T ),Qs(T ))))+
s(T )∑
j=1
k∑
ℓ=0
(
T − qj − 1 + k − ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(a(Pj ,Cj)))− S(M
ℓ(aPj ))
)
.
(28)
Proof Let us observe the following simple relations:
[1, T ] = (P1, C1, Q1) and (29)
(Pj , Qj) = (Pj+1, Cj+1, Qj+1) for all j < s(T ). (30)
By repeated applications of Corollary 4 for (X,Y, Z) = (Pj , Cj , Qj) for
j = 1, 2, ..., s(T ) based on the partitions in (29)-(30), we obtain (28). 
To arrive to our main result of this section, let us first show that to a
pure stationary strategy b∗ of Min there exists a pure stationary response
of Max that majorizes all pure (history dependent) responses uniformly
in time. Since we have only finitely many pure stationary responses of
Max, there is a best one w∗ that maximizes φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)). Depending
on whether φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)) is finite or infinite we will consider 3 cases.
We start with the case when this value is +∞. Clearly, no other
strategy can be better than this.
Next we consider the case when φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)) is finite. For this case
we need to introduce some notation. Let us denote by B(Γ) the set of
reward sequences corresponding to paths of length at most n = |V | arcs in
our graph, and let Θ ≥ 0 be the smallest constant satisfying the following
inequalities:
max
b∈B(Γ)
S(Mk(b)) ≤ Θ+ i · φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)), for i = 1, . . . , n. (31)
Let us consider a lasso reward sequence x(y) and associate to it a poly-
nomial px,y(τ ) as follows:
px,y(τ ) =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
τ + k − ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(x,y))− S(M ℓ(x))
)
.
Let P be the set of all such polynomials with negative leading coefficient
(that is the coefficient of the highest degree term) that correspond to lasso
sequences of G as above. Since the set P is finite there exist ǫ > 0 and
integer τˆ such that
∀τ ≥ τˆ and ∀p ∈ P : p(τ ) ≤ −ǫτ.
Finally, let L be the set of lasso reward sequences in G, and define
K = max
τ≥0
p∈P
{p(τ )}+ max
cX(cY )∈L
{S(Mk(cX , cY ))− |Y |φ
k(a(b∗,w∗))}.
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Note that Θ, ǫ, τˆ , and K all depend only on the graph G, the local
rewards r, k, and the strategy b∗ of Min, but not on the strategies of Max.
Note also that we will need the above definitions only when φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗))
is finite.
Lemma 6 Let b∗ be an arbitrary pure stationary strategy of Min, w∗ be
a best pure stationary response of Max, and a∗ = a(b∗,w∗) be the local
reward sequence corresponding to this pair. Assume that φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗))
is finite. Consider an arbitrary pure (possibly history dependent) strat-
egy w of Max and the corresponding reward sequence a = a(b∗,w).
Then we have the following inequality, for every δ > 0 and every T >
1
δ
(
2K2
ǫ
+K · τˆ +Θ
)
:
1
T
S(M (k)(a[1,T ])) ≤ φ
(k)(a∗) + δ. (32)
Proof Let us consider the infinite walk W corresponding to the pair
(b∗,w) and apply Lemma 5. We are going to estimate from above the
terms on the right hand side of (28) considering separately the path and
the good and bad lassos. For notational simplicity in this proof we shall
write M(I) = M(aI) where a is the reward sequence corresponding to
walk W and I is a sequence of indices.
Let us start with the path and observe by the definition of Θ that
S(Mk(Ps(T ), Qs(T )) ≤ |Ps(T ) ∪Qs(T )|φ
k(b∗,w∗) + Θ. (33)
For each lasso F (Pj , Cj), it will be convenient to introduce the term
Hj =
k∑
ℓ=0
(
T − qj − 1 + k − ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(Pj , Cj))− S(M
ℓ(Pj))
)
.
Let us next consider a good lasso F (Pj , Cj). Then by Corollary 5 and the
choice of w∗ we get
Hj = S(M
k(Pj , Cj))− S(M
k(Pj)) = |Cj | · φ
(k)(aPj (aCj )) ≤ |Cj | · φ
(k)(a∗).
(34)
Finally, we consider bad lassos. Let jα be the index of a bad lasso
F (Pjα , Cjα), for α = 1, . . . , D(T ), where D(T ) is the number of bad las-
sos appearing in W within the time horizon T . Then we claim that the
following inequality holds
D(T )∑
α=1
Hjα ≤
D(T )∑
α=1
|Cjα |φ
(k)(a∗) + Tδ −Θ. (35)
To see this, observe that by the definition of K, for α > D(T )− τˆ we have
Hjα − |Cjα |φ
(k)(a∗) ≤ K. (36)
For indices α ≤ D(T ) − τˆ , we have T − qjα − 1 ≥ τˆ since the qj indices
are pairwise distinct, and thus by the definition of K and ǫ we can write
Hjα − |Cjα |φ
(k)(a∗) ≤ K − ǫ(T − qjα − 1). (37)
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Summing up for all bad lassos we get from (36) and (37) the following
inequality
D(T )∑
α=1
(
Hjα − |Cjα |φ
(k)(a∗)
)
≤ Kτˆ +
D(T )−τˆ∑
α=1
(K − ǫ(T − qjα − 1)). (38)
Let us note that since the qj indices are pairwise distinct we have
the inequalities T − qjα − 1 ≥ D(T ) − α ≥ D(T ) − τˆ − α, for all α =
1, . . . , D(T )− τˆ . Consequently,
∑D(T )−τˆ
α=1 (T − qjα − 1) ≥
(
D(T )−τˆ
2
)
. Thus
from (38) we get
D(T )∑
α=1
(
Hjα − |Cjα |φ
(k)(a∗)
)
≤ K ·D(T )− ǫ
(
D(T )− τˆ
2
)
≤
2K2
ǫ
+ τˆK (39)
≤ Tδ −Θ. (40)
Inequality (39) is obvious when D(T ) ≤ 2K
ǫ
+ τˆ , and otherwise it follows
from the fact that
D(T )−τˆ∑
α=1
(K − ǫ(D(T )− τˆ − α)) ≤ 0
when D(T ) > 2K
ǫ
+ τˆ . Inequality (40) follows by the bound on T .
Summing up inequalities (33),(34), and (35) for all good lassos yields
the statement. 
Let us finally consider the case when φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)) = −∞. Let Θ¯ ≥ 0
and K¯ be defined by the following equations:
Θ¯ = max
b∈B(Γ)
S(Mk(b)).
K¯ = max
τ≥0
p∈P
{p(τ )}+ max
x(y)∈L
{S(Mk(x,y))− S(Mk(x))}.
Note again that Θ¯, ǫ, τˆ , and K¯ all depend only on the graph G, the
local rewards r, and k, but not on the strategies of Max.
Lemma 7 Let b∗ be an arbitrary pure stationary strategy of Min, w∗ be
a best pure stationary response of Max, and a∗ = a(b∗,w∗) be the local
reward sequence corresponding to this pair. Assume that φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)) =
−∞. Consider an arbitrary pure (possibly history dependent) strategy w
of Max and the corresponding reward sequence a = a(b∗,w). Then for
every N > 0 and T > 2n
2
ǫ
(
Θ¯ + K¯ +N + ǫ(τˆ + 1)
)
, we have the following
inequality:
1
T
S(M (k)(a[1,T ])) ≤ −N. (41)
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Proof We prove this claim similarly as in the previous lemma. We
consider again the infinite walk W corresponding to the pair (b∗,w) and
apply Lemma 5 to the reward sequence a = a(b∗,w). For simplicity, we
write again M(X) instead of M(aX). We are going to estimate from
above the terms on the right hand side of (28) considering separately the
path and the lassos. Let us note that in this case all lassos are bad. Let
us also observe by the definition of Θ¯ that
S(Mk(Ps(T ), Qs(T )) ≤ Θ¯. (42)
For convenience we introduce again for each lasso F (Pj , Cj) the term
Hj =
k∑
ℓ=0
(
T − qj − 1 + k − ℓ
k − ℓ
)(
S(M ℓ(Pj , Cj))− S(M
ℓ(Pj))
)
.
For a lasso F (Pj , Cj) with j ≤ s(T )− τˆ , we have
Hj ≤ K¯ − ǫ(T − qj − 1), (43)
since T − qj − 1 ≥ τˆ . For a lasso F (Pj , Cj) with j > s(T )− τˆ , we have
Hj ≤ K¯. (44)
Summing up inequalities (42),(43), and (44) for all lassos yields the state-
ment by elementary calculations. 
The above analysis shows that there exists a pure strategy stationary
w∗ of Max (in response to Min’s fixed pure stationary strategy b∗) that
uniformly dominates any other pure strategy w:
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
S(M (k)(a(b∗,w)[1,T ])) ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
S(M (k)(a(b∗,w)[1,T ])) ≤ φ
(k)(a(b∗,w∗)).
(45)
Corollary 6 Inequalities (45) hold for any (not necessarily pure or sta-
tionary) strategy w of Max.
Proof If φ(k)(a(b∗,w∗)) = +∞ then there is nothing to prove. Otherwise,
observe that the reward sequence corresponding to any strategy w is a
convex combination of reward sequences corresponding to pure strategies.
Therefore (45) must hold for this combination as well. 
Remark 4 A similar concept of value uniformity was considered in [19].
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 In a k-total reward BW-game, given a pure stationary strat-
egy of a player, there exists a pure stationary best response of the opponent
among all (not necessarily pure or stationary) strategies.
Proof The claim that the best response of Max is pure and stationary
follows from Corollary 6. For the case when Min responds to Max, we
can also see the claim by (45) after reversing the signs of all the rewards
and interchanging the roles of the players. 
20
Remark 5 Let us observe that the above proof goes through even if each
player has an effective reward function which is either lim inf or lim sup
(they may differ for the two players). It also goes through if we exchange
the order of lim inf (lim sup) and the expectation operator E[·]
5 Hierarchy of k-Total Rewards
In what follows we shall show that any k-total reward can be viewed as a
special case of (k+1)-total rewards. In particular, mean payoff games are
a special case of 1-total reward games, and in general of k-total reward
games.
To state and prove our results we need to obtain a functional relation
betweenM(x(y)) and the vectors x and y. For this we will need a number
of combinatorial results relate to the S and M operators.
Lemma 8 For z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈ R
n and for every k ∈ Z+ we have
Mk(z) =
(
i∑
j=1
(
k − 1 + i− j
k − 1
)
zj
∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n
)
(46)
and correspondingly
S(Mk(z)) =
n∑
j=1
(
k + n− j
k
)
zj . (47)
Proof For k = 0, the above formula with an extended definition of
the binomial coefficients [9] shows that M0 is the identity operator as
assumed. For k = 1 the above expressions coincide with the definitions of
the M and S operators. Thus, by induction on k we can write
Mk+1(z) = M(Mk(z))=
(
i∑
ℓ=1
ℓ∑
j=1
(
k − 1 + ℓ− j
k − 1
)
zj
∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n
)
=
 i∑
j=1
zj
i∑
ℓ=j
(
k − 1 + ℓ− j
k − 1
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n

=
(
i∑
j=1
(
k + i− j
k
)
zj
∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n
)
where the second equality follows by (46), and the last one by (19). Finally
(47) follows by (46) and (19). 
Let us recall a few combinatorial identities from [9], which we shall
need in the sequel.
Lemma 9
N∑
u=0
(−1)u
(
N
u
)(
X − u
R
)
=
(
X −N
X −R
)
.
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Lemma 10
N∑
u=0
(
X + u
u
)(
Y +N − u
N − u
)
=
(
X + Y +N + 1
N
)
.
Now we are ready to provide an algebraic description of theM operator
over the set of lasso sequences.
Lemma 11 Let us consider integers p, q > 0, k ≥ 0 and a lasso sequence
x(y) ∈ Sn(R) with x ∈ Z
p and y ∈ Zq, satisfying
φ(ℓ)(x(y)) = 0 for 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k − 1. (48)
Then, we have
Mk(x(y)) = Mk(x)
(
k∑
ℓ=1
S
(
Mk−ℓ(x)
)
M ℓ−1(e) + Mk(y)
)
(49)
where e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Zq, and
φ(k) (x(y)) = A
(
k∑
ℓ=1
S
(
Mk−ℓ(x)
)
M ℓ−1(e) + Mk(y)
)
=
1
q
S
(
k∑
ℓ=1
S
(
Mk−ℓ(x)
)
M ℓ−1(e) + Mk(y)
)
=
1
q
p∑
j=1
xj
[(
q + p− j + k
k
)
−
(
p− j + k
k
)]
+
1
q
q∑
i=1
(
k + q − i
k
)
yi.
(50)
Proof Let us note first that for k = 0 the condition (48) is empty,
and the summation in (49) is an empty sum, yielding M0(x(y)) = x(y).
Furthermore, for k = 1 we have by Fact 5 that M(x(y)) = x˜(y˜), where
x˜ =M(x) and y˜ = S(x)e+M(y), in agreement with (49), since condition
(48) is equivalent with saying S(y) = 0 by definition (8). Thus, (49)
follows by induction on k using the linearity of M as in Lemma 2.
Finally, (50) follows from (49) after applying the S operator to both
sides of (49) yielding the second line of (50). Then, by using the linearity
of S by Lemma 2 and applying Lemmas 3 and 8 we get
1
q
k∑
ℓ=1
(
q + ℓ− 1
ℓ
)
p∑
j=1
(
k − ℓ+ p− j
k − ℓ
)
xj +
1
q
q∑
i=1
(
k + q − i
k
)
yi
=
1
q
p∑
j=1
xj
[
k∑
ℓ=1
(
q + ℓ− 1
ℓ
)(
k − ℓ+ p− j
k − ℓ
)]
+
1
q
q∑
i=1
(
k + q − i
k
)
yi.
Finally, applying Lemma 10 with u = ℓ, N = k, X = q− 1 and Y = p− j
and subtracting the u = 0 term from both sides we get the last line of
(50). 
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Remark 6 Formula (50) shows that the value φ(k)(x(y)) is a linear com-
bination of the components of x and y. Furthermore, it can be verified
that these linear combinations for k = 0, 1, . . . , n−1, are linearly indepen-
dent. Consequently, if φn takes a finite value on a lasso sequence, then
all local rewards on this sequence must be equal to 0. On the other hand,
there are BW-games such that the φ(n−1) value, from a certain starting
position, is finite and different from zero.
We need an additional technical lemma.
Lemma 12 Let X, k ≥ 0 be integers. Then
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j2k−2j
(
k − j
j
)(
X + k − j
k − j
)
=
(
2X + k + 1
k
)
. (51)
Proof Let g(X, k) denote the summation on the left hand side. Thus,
we want to show that g(X, k) =
(
2X+k+1
k
)
. We apply induction on X ≥ 0.
For X = 0, we have g(0, k) = k + 1 by (2.4) in [9], and hence (51) holds
in this case. We assume now that it holds for X, and verify it for X + 1.
First we can show the following claim.
Claim 1
g(X + 1, k) =
1
X + 1
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(X + k + 1− 2j)g(X, k − 2j). (52)
Proof
g(X + 1, k) =
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j2k−2j
(
k − j
j
)(
X + 1 + k − j
k − j
)
=
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j2k−2j
(
k − j
j
)(
X + k − j
k − j
)
·
X + k + 1− j
X + 1
=
X + k + 1
X + 1
g(X,k) + h(k),
where
h(k) := −
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j2k−2j
(
k − j
j
)(
X + k − j
k − j
)
·
j
X + 1
=
⌊(k−2)/2⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j2(k−2)−2j
(
(k − 2)− j
j
)(
X + (k − 2)− j
(k − 2)− j
)
·
X + k − 1− j
X + 1
=
X + k − 1
X + 1
g(X,k − 2) + h(k − 2). (53)
The claim follows by iterative application of (53). 
By induction, we have g(X, k − 2j) =
(
2X+k−2j+1
k−2j
)
. Thus, it remains
to prove the following claim.
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Claim 2
1
X + 1
⌊k/2⌋∑
j=0
(X + k + 1− 2j)
(
2X + k − 2j + 1
k − 2j
)
=
(
2(X + 1) + k + 1
k
)
.
(54)
Proof We use induction on k. The base cases k = 0 and 1 are easily
verified. Assume the statement holds for all integers less than k. Denote
by f(k) the left hand side of (54). Then
f(k) =
1
X + 1
(X + k + 1)
(
2X + k + 1
k
)
+ f(k − 2)
=
1
X + 1
(X + k + 1)
(
2X + k + 1
k
)
+
(
2(X + 1) + (k − 2) + 1
k − 2
)
=
(2X + k + 1)!
k!(2X + 3)!
[2(2X + 3)(X + k + 1) + k(k − 1)]
=
(
2(X + 1) + k + 1
k
)
.

For the main claim of this section, we introduce a split operation on
sequences: to a given sequence x = (x1, x2, . . .), we associate x
(1) =
(x1,−x1, x2,−x2, . . .).
Theorem 3 For a nonnegative integer k and any lasso sequence x(y) we
have
φ(k+1)
(
x
(1)
(
y
(1)
))
= 2k−1φ(k) (x(y)) . (55)
Proof We prove this claim by induction on k. For k = 0, let us note that
M(x1,−x1, x2,−x2, . . .) = (x1, 0, x2, 0, . . .) implying that φ
(1)(x(1)) =
1
2
φ(0)(x).
Let us next assume that we have the equalities
φ(ℓ+1)
(
x
(1)
(
y
(1)
))
= 2ℓ−1φ(ℓ) (x(y))
for all 0 ≤ ℓ < k. Thus, in particular, the signs of φ(ℓ+1)
(
x(1)
(
y(1)
))
and φ(ℓ) (x(y)) are the same for all ℓ < k. Therefore, by Fact 4 and
the definition of φ(k), both sides of (55) are simultaneously equal to ±∞,
whenever φ(k)
(
x(1)
(
y(1)
))
6= 0. Hence it is enough to prove the claim
for lasso sequences satisfying
φ(ℓ+1)
(
x
(1)
(
y
(1)
))
= φ(ℓ) (x(y)) = 0 for all ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
(56)
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Under these conditions Lemma 11 can be applied and we get for the split
sequence x(1)
(
y(1)
)
that 2qφ(k+1)
(
x(1)
(
y(1)
))
is equal to
p∑
j=1
xj
1∑
r=0
(−1)r
[(
2(q + p− j) + 1− r + k + 1
k + 1
)
−
(
2(p− j) + 1− r + k + 1
k + 1
)]
+
q∑
i=1
yi
1∑
r=0
(−1)r
(
2(q − i) + 1− r + k + 1
k + 1
)
=
p∑
j=1
xj
[(
2(q + p− j) + k + 1
k
)
−
(
2(p− j) + k + 1
k
)]
+
q∑
i=1
yi
(
2(q − i) + k + 1
k
)
.
Let us also note that under conditions (56) we can apply Lemma 11 to
φ(ℓ) (x(y)) and express it as in (50) for all ℓ < k. Let us finally note
that using these expressions and using Lemma 12 three times, with X =
q + p− j, X = p− j and X = q − i we get
2φ(k+1)
(
x
(1)
(
y
(1)
))
=
k∑
j=0
αjφ
(j)(x(y)), (57)
where by Lemma 12
αj =
{
0 if j < k
2
,
(−1)k−j22j−k
(
j
k−j
)
otherwise.
By condition (56), equality (57) further simplifies to
2φ(k+1)
(
x
(1)
(
y
(1)
))
= αkφ
(k) (x(y)) = 2kφ(k) (x(y))
from which the statement follows. 
The above theorem allows us to view the family of k-total reward
games as a subfamily of (k + 1)-total reward games.
Corollary 7 Given a k-total reward BW-game, one can construct in lin-
ear time an equivalent (k + 1)-total reward BW-game.
Proof Let us consider an arbitrary BW-game Γ = (G, r, φ(k)) and let
us define its split, denoted by Γ˜ = (G˜ = (B˜ ∪ W˜ , E˜), r˜, φ(k+1)), as the
game obtained from Γ by subdividing each arc of local reward r(u, v) by
a vertex w = wuv and defining r˜(u,w) = r(u, v) and r˜(w, v) = −r(u, v).
Clearly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the strategies in Γ
and Γ˜. Then, it is also clear that the expected reward sequence arising
from a play in Γ˜ is the split sequence of the reward sequence arising from
the corresponding play in Γ. Theorem 3 implies that the games (G, r, φ(k))
and (G˜, r˜, φ(k+1)) are equivalent; more precisely, the effective values of the
corresponding plays are equal up to a multiplicative factor of 2k−1. 
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6 Discussion
One can think of at least three directions for generalizing the above results
as discussed below.
Due to an example of a non-zero sum mean payoff BW-game [10] that
does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies, we can
conclude by Theorem 3 that, for any k ∈ Z+, there are non-zero sum k-
total reward games that have no such Nash equilibria either. Let us note
that the construction in Corollary 7 creates games in which every directed
cycle has zero length. Interestingly, in this case we are not aware of any
Nash equilibrium free example with 1-total effective reward and without
directed cycles of zero length [2].
It seems also possible (and important) to generalize the above results
to general stochastic games with perfect information, or in other words, to
replace the BW-model considered in this paper by the BWR-model, where
R stands for random positions (origins of moves of chance); this model
is equivalent to the classical Gillette’s model (see [3]). For k = 1, it was
shown in [4] that there always exists a saddle point, which can be realized
by pure stationary uniformly optimal strategies. The similar question for
k > 1 remains open; moreover it does not seem easy to formulate Shapley’s
equations in this case.
For the case of non-perfect information, Thuijsman and Vrieze [28]
gave a necessary and sufficient condition for a 1-total general stochastic
game to have a saddle point provided the players are restricted to their
pure stationary strategies. Extending these results to k > 1 seems also
hard.
Finally, we discuss the complexity issues related to k-total reward BW-
games. It is a long-standing open question whether there is a polynomial
time algorithm for the case k = 0, although it can be solved in pseudo-
polynomial time [24, 30] and randomized subexponential time [1, 12, 29].
Let us also remark that the problem of deciding if the value of a mean
payoff BW-game is below (or above) a given threshold belongs to both NP
and co-NP ([11, 15, 30]). Our reduction in Theorem 3 shows that solving
k-total reward games is at least as hard as solving mean payoff games.
In particular, every 0-total game can be viewed as a special 1-total game.
Yet, a polynomial reduction in the other direction is not known. On the
other hand, Theorem 1 shows that the k-total BW-game with integral
local rewards can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time4. Furthermore,
the 1-player case (that is, Markov decision processes) with k ≤ 1 can be
solved in polynomial time via linear programming [20, 4]. The similar
algorithmic question for k > 1 is open.
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